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INTRODUCTION

Just a few years ago in the span of the judicial history of this
state, the law of judgments in Texas was fairly simple. About all
lawyers and judges needed to know about judgments was that one
could be obtained by default if the defendant failed to answer by
the appointed time on the appointed day, or that one could be
earned in courtroom combat by trial "on the merits" before a
judge alone or before a judge and a jury. It was also helpful, but
only occasionally critically necessary, to know the difference in a
general way between a judgment which was only interlocutory and
* Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court (Retired).
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one which was final.
Then along came Article 2524-1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes,
providing for declaratory judgments, and Rule 166-A, Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, providing for summary judgments. These newfangled procedures for getting rid of lawsuits were not welcomed
with open arms by old time litigators. They had accepted, albeit
somewhat reluctantly, abolition by the 1941 "New Rules" of the
general demurrer which had served well as a trap for the untrained
or unwary, but acceptance of a procedure for trials by affidavit
which sidestepped juries, or which did not result in judgments
awarding or denying affirmative relief, was almost too much to ask.
Default judgments and judgments on the merits did not exactly
fade away, but after a long educational shakedown cruise, the new
judgment devices are being used with increasing frequency. Study
of some of the rules governing use of these devices should be helpful. This article will deal only with declaratory judgment rules, and
a discussion of summary judgment rules will be saved for another
author or another day.
II.

HISTORY

Declaratory relief was unknown at common law. It has been
pointed out that, at common law,
[t]he courts took no official interest in the affairs of civil life until
one person had wronged another; then the object was to give relief
for the injury inflicted. In other words, some violation of personal or
private rights or a wrongful injury to a person must have occurred
before the courts would take judicial cognizance of controversies between persons.
While the declaratory judgment did not receive statutory sanction
in this country generally until about 1920, it has been sanctioned in
England since 1852, and in Scotland its history runs back several
hundred years. Apparently its origin can be traced to the Roman
civil law, and it is today part of the judicial system of many
countries.'
Once the concept took root in the jurisprudence of this country,
the Congress and many of the state legislatures embraced it in
1. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 3 (1965); see also 3 TEx. L. REv. 483, 484
(1925).
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their statutory law.2 The Texas Legislature adopted the Uniform
Act, with some slight variations, in 1943V

The march towards a nation-wide fulfillment of the concept suffered a temporary setback in 1910 by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Muskrat v. United States.4 As authorized by an Act of Congress, the suit was instituted by members

of Indian tribes in the United States Court of Claims, with right of
appeal to the Supreme Court, to determine the validity of two Acts

of Congress affecting title and rights of users to lands allotted to
the Indians. The Supreme Court held the act authorizing the suit
and appeal unconstitutional.5 Unconstitutionality was predicated
on the constitutional provisions limiting exercise of judicial power
of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." The Court, after
defining the limitation on its constitutional power, said "that judicial power . . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction." The Court opined that to entertain such actions as
were there attempted, would require the court "to give opinions in
the nature of advice concerning legislative action, a function never
conferred upon it by the Constitution . ... ."a

2. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has now been adopted either in whole or
with some variation in 39 states and two territories. See TEx. Rev. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
2524-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
3. See id. art. 2524-1, §§ 1-16 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1982). Prior to 1924 Texas courts
had given declaratory judgments without "labeling them as such." 3 Tax. L. REv. 483, 484
(1925). As an interesting sidelight to the Texas Supreme Court's frequent insistence that it
does not give "advisory opinions," see In Re House Bill No. 537 Of The Thirty-Eighth Legislature, 113 Tex. 367, 256 S.W. 573 (1923), in which the court "advised" that a house bill
was unconstitutional, although its jurisdiction to rule on the question apparently had not
been invoked by either an appeal or a direct proceeding and the function was one normally
reserved to the Attorney General. See id. at 370-71, 256 S.W. at 574-75. The only critical or
definitive analysis of the statute was written by Gus M. Hodges, University of Texas Professor of Law, and is available to the author of this article but is now out of print. See G.
Hodges, General Survey Of The Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act In Texas, TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, at VII- XXI (Vernon 1951) (superseded). Two articles that deal
with the Act and should be noted are, Gifford, DeclaratoryJudgments Under The Model
State Administrative ProcedureActs, 13 Hous. L. Rev. 825 (1976); Comment, The Binding
Effect Of Federal DeclaratoryJudgments On State Courts, 51 TEx. L. Rev. 743 (1973).
4. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
5. Id. at 363.
6. Tex. CONST. art. V, §§3, 6, 8, 16, and 18 (confer civil jurisdiction upon Texas courts
in "cases" and "suits").
7. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
8. Id. at 362. The Court concluded: "we are constrained to hold that these actions pre-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 14 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

In contrast, Harvard Professor Edwin Borchard advocated the
adoption of the declaratory concept. Professor Borchard saw the
declaratory judgment as a means whereby a plaintiff could avoid
"peril and insecurity by obtaining an authoritative adjudication of
his rights . . . ." In this way, a plaintiff could reduce the risk of
acting at his own peril, while attempting to protect his legal rights
and relations. Professor Borchard concluded:
The importance of the power to sue on the part of an endangered or
potentially endangered or disputed possessor of rights is that judicial protection may be obtained before the danger has ripened into
catastrophe and before the other party has commenced suit to enforce his claims. 10
In 1933, the Supreme Court, by its decision in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Wallace," virtually abandoned
Muskrat while yet paying lip service to it. The suit was for a declaratory judgment that a state taxing statute was unconstitutional. The Court stated the question before it as whether the controversy was any the less justiciable because "through a modified
procedure appellant has been permitted to present it in the state
courts, without praying for an injunction or alleging that irreparable injury will result from collection of the tax."'" The Court noted
in the margin of its opinion that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, or similar statutes, has been adopted in twenty-nine
states and three territories, and concluded that it had jurisdiction
"so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy which is
finally determined by the judgment below."' Is
III. THE FEDERAL
A.

APPROACH -

STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL

The Statute
Because of frequent reliance by Texas courts on federal court

sent no justiciable controversy within the authority of the court .

...

" Id. at 363.

9. Borchard, Judicial Relief For Peril And Insecurity, 45 HAgv. L. Rzv. 793, 807
(1932).
10. Id. at 806.
11. 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
12. Id. at 262-63.
13. Id. at 264.
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decisions in assessing their own duties and obligations in declaratory judgment suits, recognition of a vital distinction between the
two governing statutes is critical to a correct understanding and
application of the Texas statute.
The Congress did not adopt the Uniform Act. The controlling
statute is section 2201, Title 28, United States Code Annotated,
adopted in 1934. It reads:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, .. any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
Section 2202, United States Code Annotated, and Rule 57, Federal Rules of Procedure, are also relevant. Section 2202 provides
that "[flurther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory
judgment or decree may be granted. . . ."1 Rule 57 provides that
"[t]he procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment. . . shall be
in accordance with these rules. . .. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief
in cases where it is appropriate. ' 1
B. Interpretive Decisions
It is obvious from reading sections 2201 and 2202 of the federal
statute that action by the federal courts to "declare the rights and
other legal relations" of litigants and to grant other relief is strictly
discretionary; the word "may" is used in its customary permissive
sense.17 It was previously thought that the terms of the act were
mandatory,"5 but it was settled by the Supreme Court that it was
not.19 While it is discretionary, "[t]he discretion of the trial court
is not absolute. All circuits agree that it is a sound judicial discre14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1982). Emphasis supplied by the author of this article
unless otherwise indicated.
15. Id. § 2202.
16. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 57 (1980).
17. See, e.g., PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1973); Solenoid Devices, Inc. v. Ledex, Inc., 375 F.2d 444, 445 (9th Cir. 1967); Paschal v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co.,'264 F. Supp. 836, 839-40 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
18. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2759 (1973).
19. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 498 (1942).
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The United States Supreme Court in

Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v.Rickover,1 concluded that the
"Declaratory Judgments Act was an authorization, not a command.
It gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of
rights; it did not impose a duty to do so. . . ." The Court added:

"[o]f course a District Court cannot decline to entertain such an
action as a matter of whim or personal disinclination.""
IV.

THE TEXAS APPROACH -

STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL

The Texas approach will be examined by the format used to examine the federal approach; the relevant statutory provisions will
be quoted and the interpretive cases will be analyzed.
A.

The Statute

Article 2524-1 is so brief, direct, and clear that there should be
little basis for difference as to its terms or its meaning. The relevant sections of the statute are as follows:
Section 1. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. .

..

The decla-

rations may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree.
Section 2. Any person interested under [written instruments or
laws] may have determined any question of construction or validity
. .and obtain a declaration of rights ....
Section 3. A contract may be construed either before or after
there has been a breach thereof.
Section 4. Any person interested as or through [a legal representative, a fiduciary, creditor, or beneficiary of an administered estate]
may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto
*

Section 6. The Court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or
entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
20. C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL

PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 2759 (1973).

21. 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
22. Id. at 112.
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rise to the proceeding.
Section 7. All orders, judgments, and decrees under this Act may
be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees.
Section 8 Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper.
Section 10. In any proceeding under this Act the Court may make
such award of costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as
may seem equitable and just.
Section 12. This Act is declared to be remedial
liberally construed and administered.

. . .

and is to be

Section 15. This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
States which enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments
and decrees.
Special declaratory judgment statutes will not be considered.2
A careful reading of section 1 of the state statute reflects that,
unlike the federal statute, it does not purport to grant a power
which may be used by the courts in their discretion to give declaratory relief; rather, while not a jurisdictional statute, 4 it confers an
unlimited power to give declaratory relief in either affirmative or
negative form. That such is the proper interpretation of the section
is borne out by section 6 in which discretionary power is expressly
conferred to "refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or
decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered,
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the proceeding. ' 25 If the power were generally discretionary, section 6 would be unneeded and surplusage. Moreover, the statute
presents a subject to which the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another)

23. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (Adminis-

trative Procedure and Texas Register Act); id. art. 717m-1, §§ 1-13 (Vernon Supp. 1982)
(declaratory judgment concerning validity of securities).
24. See Phillips v. City of Odessa, 287 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1956,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cowan v. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, no
writ).
25. TEx. Rsv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 6 (Vernon 1965).
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seems peculiarly applicable."
The clincher that the court's discretion to refuse declaratory relief is limited to section 6 situations is found in the history of the
Uniform Act. An earlier version of section 6 reads as follows:
Discretionary.The court may refuse to exercise the power to declare
rights or other legal relations in any proceeding where a decision

under it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which
gave rise to the proceeding, or in any proceeding where the declaration or construction is7 not necessary, and proper, at the time under
all the circumstances.

As thus written, section 6 conferred a discretion to refuse to act
which was virtually unlimited. As finally written and as adopted in
this state, the emphasized language was eliminated and discretion
to refuse to grant declaratory relief was limited as above indicated.
Hodges called attention in his article to the limitation on discretion in this language:
Although there have been variant decisions in some jurisdictions, it
is accepted that ... the only proper grounds for exercising discretion in favor of refusing a declaratory judgment is that such a judg-

ment would not terminate the controversy, as provided in Sec. 6 of
the Act."8

There are other sections of the statute which confer discretionary powers, thus indicating that the general power to grant declaratory relief is mandatory and not discretionary. Section 8 confers
discretionary power to grant further relief "whenever necessary or
proper," and section 10 confers discretionary power in the assessment of costs and attorney's fees.
It seems obvious that such general discretion as is conferred by
the statute is conferred upon litigants and not upon the courts.
Sections 2 and 4 provide that "any person interested . . . may
have determined any question of construction. . . ," or "may have
a declaration of rights. . . " in the many areas delineated in those

sections. The sections give the prospective litigant the right, at his
26. Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923).
27. Borchard, The Uniform Act On DeclaratoryJudgments, 34 HAnv. L. REv. 697, 710
(1921).
28. G. Hodges, General Survey Of The Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act in Texas,
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, at XVI (Vernon 1951) (superseded).
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discretion, to have his rights declared by the courts.2 9 The expressions, "may have determined" and "may have a declaration," as
used in sections 2 and 4 of the statute, interpreted in the context
in which they are used, surely mean "is entitled to have determined" and "is entitled to have a declaration." Thus, except as
modified in section 6, the litigant's right becomes the court's duty.
Courts of other jurisdictions interpreting the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act have recognized and enforced the requirement
of a duty to act in other than section 6 situations. In doing so in
0 an Ohio Court of ApCelina Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sadler,8
peals, after quoting the state's equivalent of section 6, said:
The discretion thus vested in a trial court is a limited discretion and
would be erroneously exercised in the event the court refused to
render a declaratory judgment when the declaration otherwise
comes within the scope of the Act and the judgment or decree would
terminate the uncertainty or controversy. 1
In like vein, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognized in
Melnick v. Melnick s ' that its original statute's section 6, later repealed, "merely authorized the court to refuse to render a judgment, where such judgment would not terminate the controversy
3
or uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding."
The opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Robert T. Foley Co. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission," is far
more positive in recognizing and enforcing the duty to act. In that
case the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that certain sewerage charges were unconstitutional and also sought a declaration
that the resolutions imposing the charges were invalid as violating
contractual rights. On appeal, the plaintiffs complained of the trial
court's failure to declare its right with respect to the latter question. In responding to that complaint, the court of appeals said
that "the circuit court did not deal with this question," and added
that the circuit court's decree recited "only that the defendant's

29. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Ross, 123 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1938), aff'd, 136 Tex. 66, 145 S.W.2d 1089 (1941).
30. 217 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
31. Id. at 257.
32. 25 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
33. Id. at 115.
34. 389 A.2d 350 (Md. 1978).
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motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiffs' motion was denied.

' 35

The court then quoted from a prior opinion as

follows:
While a declaratory decree need not be in any particular form, it
must pass upon and adjudicate the issues raised in the proceeding,
to the end that the rights of the parties are clearly delineated and
the controversy terminated. . . ." In the instant case, it is clear that

the circuit court erred by failing to set forth in its judgment 3a declaration of the party's rights with regard to the issues raised.
Having so held, the court vacated the circuit court's judgment and
remanded the cause for the entry of a new judgment which would
"include a declaration of the rights of the parties." '
B.

Intepretive Decisions -

General

Early on, Texas courts seized upon the beneficial purposes of the
statute8 as a sound basis for giving it a broad interpretation and
application. This is no better illustrated than by the opinions in
Railroad Commission v. Houston Natural Gas Corp.39 and Cobb v.
Harrington."
In the first case, Houston Natural Gas took a statutory de novo
appeal to the Railroad Commission from an ordinance of the City
of Palacios reducing gas rates. After a hearing had been set by the
Commission, Houston Natural Gas filed a declaratory judgment
suit seeking a declaration that the Commission was not authorized
by the appeal statute to use its own investigative and legal personnel, as it proposed to do, to assist in arriving at just and reasonable
rates. 4 ' The Gas Company also sought injunctive relief. By pleas to
the jurisdiction and in abatement, the Commission questioned the
right to maintain the suit for declaratory relief, contending that it
was only another method of obtaining injunctive relief, and also
that the suit was one which merely raised questions of practice and
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. at 359 (quoting in part Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechingen Co., 320 A.2d 266, 274
(Md. 1974)).

37. Id. at 359.
38. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 12 (Vernon 1965).
39. 186 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
40. 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945).
41. Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 186 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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procedure before the administrative agency.
The trial court overruled the pleas to the jurisdiction and in
abatement and held on the merits that the statutes authorized the
Commission "to so furnish and use its employees and their evidence in the preparation of and on the appeal and de novo hearing
... ." On appeal, the Gas Company abandoned the prayer for injunctive relief. The Austin Court of Civil Appeals, in a somewhat
lengthy opinion dealing with the nature of declaratory judgment
actions, held that such a suit was a proper method for obtaining a
construction of the statute and its validity, and that the use which
the Commission proposed to make of its employees and their testimony was proper. The trial court's judgment was affirmed."
Within a year after issuance of the opinion in Railroad Commission v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., the Supreme Court decided
Cobb v. Harrington.4 8 Here again, the right to seek a declaratory
judgment was questioned.
Harrington sought by his suit against certain state officials to
obtain a declaratory judgment declaring "whether or not" he and
his associates were "legally liable to pay . . . an occupation tax
measured by the gross receipts of 'motor carriers' and levied by
. . . Article 7066b(a). . .. '" The trial court abated the suit on the
ground that it was a suit against the state brought without its consent. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellants "declaring their status under the statutes involved, to the effect that, under the facts as stipulated, they neither pursue the
occupation of 'motor carrier' or 'common carrier motor carrier,' nor
are they liable as such for payment of the occupation tax imposed
by Art. 7066b(a). ' ' 4 The supreme court affirmed, 4 and in the
course of its opinion held that a declaratory judgment action (1)
"is neither legal nor equitable, but sui generis"; (2) " 'is an alternative or additional remedy to facilitate the administration of justice
more readily' "; (3) " 'is an instrumentality to be wielded in the

42. See id. at 127.

43. 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945). Cobb, decided November 14, 1945, was decided less than one year after Houston Natural Gas, decided January 17, 1945.
44. Id. at 362, 190 S.W.2d at 710.
45. Harrington v. Cobb, 185 S.W.2d 133, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1944), a/I'd, 144
Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945).
46. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945).
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interest of preventative justice' "; (4) with a scope that " 'should

be kept wide and liberal, and should not be hedged about by technicalities' "; (5) "does not supplant any existing remedy"; and (6)
"is intended as a speedy and effective remedy for the determination of the rights of the parties when a real controversy has
arisen
4' 7
committed.
been
actually
has
wrong
the
before
and even
The rules laid down in Cobb v. Harrington marked out very
clearly the duty of Texas courts to make the Declaratory Judgments Act a useful tool in the solution of legal problems and controversies, either before or after a legal wrong has been committed.
It was not contrived as a tool for use solely by the advocate to get a
favorable declaration; rather, it was intended as a tool for use by
the courts to make a correct declaration of the matters at issue,
once jurisdiction has attached, whether the particular declaration
is sought by several or none of the parties to the litigation. Such, in
effect, was the holding by the supreme court in Guilliams v.
Koonsman,"8 when, after stating the contentions of the opposing
parties as to the meaning of a certain provision in a will, the court
said: "[w]e do not agree entirely with either of the parties, albeit
our construction of the fourth paragraph of the will is much nearer
that contended for by petitioner than that of the respondent and
the courts below."'4" The court then proceeded to reform the judgments of the trial court and the court of civil appeals "to decree
that the true meaning and effect of the fourth paragraph of the
will is.

.

. [a meaning which neither of the parties had sought]."'"6

In Railroad Commission v. Houston Natural Gas Corp.,51 the
court cited authorities which held that the taking of jurisdiction in
the declaratory proceeding is within the sound discretion of the
trial court.0 ' No doubt the authorities on which that holding was
based were responsible for the filing of a plea to the jurisdiction in
that and other cases.' 3 Significant, however, is the fact that, while
47. Id. at 367-68, 190 S.W.2d at 713 (quoting in part W. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs § 3, at 11-12 (1940)).

48. 154 Tex. 401, 279 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
49. Id. at 404, 279 S.W.2d at 581.
50. Id. at 408, 279 S.W.2d at 583.51. 186 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

52. Id. at 123.
53. See Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1970);
Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 362, 190 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1945).
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most of the holdings by the court of civil appeals in that case were
expressly approved by the supreme court in Cobb v. Harrington,
that particular holding was not approved.
Rules governing jurisdiction of Texas courts in declaratory judgment actions are often expressed in generalities. For example, the
supreme court has held in a number of cases that the statute does
not authorize the giving of "advisory opinions" in cases which do
not involve a "justiciable controversy."" In Board of Water Engineers v. City of San Antonio,'5 the court said: "The expressions
'advisory opinion' and 'justiciable controversy' as here used refer to
the requirements, which undoubtedly exist as prerequisite to the
declaratory judgment process, that (a) there shall be a real controversy between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined by
the judicial declaration sought."" A "declaratory judgment" and
an "advisory opinion" were accurately distinguished in an opinion
by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Douglas Oil Co. v. State"7
as follows:
The essential difference between the declaratory judgment and the
purely advisory opinion lies in the fact that the former is a binding
adjudication of the contested rights of the litigants, though unaccompanied by consequential relief; whereas, the latter is merely the
opinion of the judges or court, adjudicates nothing, and is binding
on no one."
When the courts refuse to take jurisdiction of declaratory judg54. See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 491 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1973) (declaratory relief is
improper where deed sought to be prevented is accomplished and declaratory judgment
would not settle controversy); Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968)
(court may not render advisory opinion on liability of party which had not yet been determined); California Prods., Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 160 Tex. 586, 591, 334 S.W.2d
780, 783 (1960) (where declaratory relief would not settle controversy and advisory opinion
is sought, declaratory judgment is not proper).
55. 155 Tex. 111, 283 S.W.2d 722 (1955).
56. Id. at 114, 283 S.W.2d at 724. In Ainsworth v. Oil City Brass Works, 271 S.W.2d 754
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1954, no writ), the court recognized that declaratory relief
would be appropriate when "the fact situation manifests the presence of 'ripening seeds of a
controversy.' " Id. at 761. Perhaps relaxing the real controversy requirement, "ripening
seeds of controversy" appears when the situation indicates threatened litigation in the near
future which is unavoidable. See R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PACTICE § 2.05.1 (1981); E.
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JunomeNTs 41-42 (1934).
57. 81 S.W.2d 1064 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), rev'd sub nom., Federal Royalty Co.

v. State, 128 Tex. 324, 98 S.W.2d 993 (1936).
58. Id. at 1077.
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ment actions, or, having taken jurisdiction, refuse to give declaratory relief because the controversy is moot, or too contingent, 59 or
only advisory, 60 or the action is premature,"1 the ultimate and cumulative reason is that there is no "justiciable controversy" within
the court's constitutional competence to try or decide. The trial
court has jurisdiction to decide whether the action presents a "justiciable controversy," but if it concludes that the action does not,
the only correct judgment to be rendered is one of dismissal; 62
however, a take-nothing judgment will get the same practical
result."
C.

Interpretive Decisions -

Discretion

It is in the field of discretion that Texas courts appear to have
wandered far afield from permissible statutory powers. This deviation has resulted primarily from an acceptance of the law as announced by courts of other jurisdictions with different statutes, or
from a misunderstanding of the limitation of discretion imposed by
section 6 of the Texas statute.
The danger in picking up discretionary quotes from courts of
other jurisdictions is apparent when they are based upon different
statutory language.
As previously discussed, section 6 of the Texas Act provides discretion in which a trial court may refuse to grant declaratory relief
and render a take-nothing judgment. An early example of a proper
use of the discretion there conferred is found in Town of Santa
Rosa v. Johnson." The right to refuse to grant declaratory relief in
that case was specifically related to the section 6 authority, as is
made clear by the court's statement:
Under the terms of section 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act, the entry of a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the
trial court. .

..

A binding decree relating to the validity or invalid-

ity of the incorporation of the Town of Santa Rosa could not be
59. See Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1979).
60. See Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Anderson, 445 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. 1969).

61. See id. at 515; C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2757

(1973).

62. See United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 358 F.2d 714, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1966).
63. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. California Prods., Inc., 324 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1959), afl'd, 160 Tex. 586, 334 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1960).
64. 184 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, no writ).
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rendered in the absence of the State of Texas, represented by its
proper officers.65
There are many other cases in which the discretionary "right of
refusal" has been exercised under the express authority of section

6.66 However, even in this situation, exercise of discretion to refuse
cannot be arbitrary. Moreover, the discretion granted by section
6 may be exercised to grant declaratory relief, even though some
issues may remain unresolved. 5 A concomitant of the discretion to

refuse is the discretion to grant.
Some courts have appropriated the language noted in Town of
Santa Rosa v. Johnson" to the effect that "the entry of a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the trial court" 70 as authorizing
a trial court, which has accepted jurisdiction, to decline to grant

declaratory relief in other than section 6 situations.7 1 The increasing tendency to do so is best illustrated in K.M.S. Research Laboratories,Inc. v. Willingham,7 2 in which a defendant in a personal

injury suit sought a declaratory judgment of non-liability by counterclaim, and the court dismissed the counterclaim on the ground
65. Id. at 340-41.
66. See Blythe v. City of Graham, 303 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1957, no writ) (as "proper" parties had not been joined in suit, trial court should refuse
declaratory relief where controversy would not be settled); Zamora v. Zamora, 241 S.W.2d
635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1951, no writ) (while dismissal proper where declaratory
judgment would not terminate controversy, trial court erred in dismissing where court properly had power to decree partition).
67. See Zamora v. Zamora, 241 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1951, no writ)
(exercise of discretion to decline declaratory judgment must be limited to and controlled by
section 6). In Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), property owners were seeking injunction and declaratory relief to
prevent city from enforcing certain city ordinances. The court held that the trial court erred
in refusing to declare the rights of the parties and, in doing so, imposed that duty on the
appellate court. See id. at 237; see also Tall Timbers Corp. v. Anderson, 370 S.W.2d 214,
217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 378 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. 1964).
68. See Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kimble v. Baker, 285 S.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1955, no writ). But see Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co. v. Jim Ned Indep.
School Dist., 457 S.W.2d 102, 105-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970, no writ).
69. 184 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, no writ).
70. Id. at 340-41.
71. See Crawford v. City of Houston, 600 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co. v. Jim Ned Indep.
School Dist., 457 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970, no writ).
72. 629 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
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that such a declaration was not authorized. Alternatively, the court
concluded that "the entertaining of a declaratory judgment rests
with the sound discretion of the trial court. "'
Examination of the opinion in President v. Vance,7 upon which
the court in K.M.S. Research relied, reveals that the court cited
Wright and Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, and two
federal cases for its statement that "it is well settled that a declaratory judgment always rests within the sound discretion of the
court. 17 The statement cannot correctly be regarded as a controlling precedent; it is a correct interpretation of the federal statute
but, as shown above, it is not a correct interpretation of the Texas
statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

Texas lawyers, unlike lawyers in many of the other states, need
to adapt to declaratory judgment procedures which differ in some
important respects from procedures in the federal judicial system.
A capsuled summary of some of the features of the procedures
which are similar and some which differ can be drawn from an
analysis of governing statutes and their respective judicial interpretations. Witness:
1. In neither system do the courts have jurisdiction to give "advisory opinions"; they may only entertain jurisdiction in actions
which involve "justiciable controversies."
2. Cases which are premature, or in which the controversy is
moot or too contingent,7 6 do not present "justiciable controversies"
in either system.
3. A motion to dismiss for want or lack of jurisdiction is in order in both systems when the action does not present a "justiciable
controversy."
4. If a prior suit is pending involving the same issues and in
which full relief may be awarded, the courts of both systems will
refuse declaratory relief.
73. Id. at 174.
74. 627 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 364 n.76; see also Southern Nat'l Bank v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 237
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Double contingency cases are too "iffy" and thus too contingent. See Firemen's Ins.
Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2757 (1973).
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5. Where such a prior suit is pending in a state court, the issue
should be raised by plea in abatement just as in other cases of
prior-suit pending pleas in abatement.
6. Even if an action presents a "justiciable controversy," and
thus invokes the declaratory judgment jurisdiction of the federal
courts, these courts may, in the exercise of sound discretion, refuse
to render such a judgment.
7. The only situation in which the state courts are authorized
to refuse to render a declaratory judgment in the exercise of a
sound discretion, once jurisdiction is established, is where the
judgment "would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
8. Trial court judgments in the federal courts granting or denying declaratory relief are reviewed on appeal solely for abuse of
discretion.
9. Except in sections 6, 8, and 10, cases where review is for
abuse of discretion, review in state courts should be the same as of
"other orders, judgments, and decrees" for errors of law, whether
in ruling on pleas to the jurisdiction or in abatement, or in rendering declarations, or in refusing to grant declaratory relief in other
than section 6 situations. That review procedure should be a welcome relief from the misused "abuse of discretion" review.
10. In all cases in the state courts, discretionary and otherwise,
judgments in the courts of appeal and the supreme court should
be, respectively, in keeping with Rules 434 and 505, Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.
11. If the trial court has erred by dismissing for want of jurisdiction, by abating because of pendency of a prior suit, by granting
or refusing to grant declaratory relief in other than discretionary
situations, or by abusing its discretion in discretionary situations, a
court of appeals should reverse the judgment of the trial court and
"render such judgment or decree as the court below should have
rendered." If a court of appeals affirms an erroneous trial court
judgment, the supreme court should reverse the judgments of both
courts and "render such judgment as the court of civil appeals
'
should have rendered." 7

77. See CALVERT, Appellate Court Judgments, or Strange Things Happen on the Way
to Judgment, 6 Tax. TECH. L. Rv. 915, 921-22 (1975).
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